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1. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
2. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a), 1362(7).
3. Id. § 1344.
4. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2006).
5. Id. § 328.3(a)(5).
6. Id. § 328.3(a)(3).
7. Id. § 328.3(a)(1)-(7).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Federal jurisdiction over wetlands under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)1
has always been difficult to delineate.  Wetlands, by definition can be difficult
to classify as either water or land.  The CWA attempts to regulate these areas;
it prohibits discharge of material without a permit into “navigable waters,”
which are in turn defined in section 1362(7) of the CWA as the “waters of the
United States.”   The Army Corps of Engineers is charged with granting2
permits, and must make the determination of whether or not certain areas of
wetlands fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA.   The Corps has interpreted3
the phrase “navigable waters” very broadly to include waters “which are
currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in
interstate or foreign commerce.”   The tributaries of any of these “waters” also4
fall within the Corps’ jurisdiction.   Intrastate waters are covered if their “use,5
degradation or destruction . . . could affect interstate or foreign commerce.”6
Wetlands “adjacent” to waters, such as those described above, except waters
that are themselves wetlands, also clearly fall within federal jurisdiction under
the CWA.   Jurisdictional problems arise however when there are bodies of7
water or wetlands close to but not directly connected to navigable waters.
These areas may still have significant impact on the neighboring navigable
waters if a developer fills them in, or an industrial site discharges pollutants
into them.  Thus the Corps of Engineers has sought to regulate some of these
wetland areas, in order to hold true to the CWA’s overall goals “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”8
This note analyzes the extent of federal jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters, and how the Supreme Court’s fractured decision
in Rapanos v. United States may have changed this analysis.   The highly9
anticipated decision in Rapanos and its companion case, Carabell v. Army
Corps of Engineers, was handed down on June 19, 2006, with the court
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consolidated, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2006); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted
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12. Id. at 135.
13. Definition of Waters of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3).
issuing five separate opinions, none of which garnered a majority of the
Justices.   Part II of this note will discuss in detail the facts of the two10
combined cases, Rapanos and Carabell, and clarify the multiple opinions and
standards articulated by the Court.  Part III will discuss the impact of the
decision to date on lower courts and how district and circuit courts have
struggled to apply the different standards articulated by the Supreme Court.
Parts IV and V will discuss the response of other government branches,
specifically that of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  Part VI lays out some of the efforts of non-
governmental actors in shaping this area of law.  Finally Part VII concludes
that the Rapanos decision has in fact made the jurisdiction question markedly
more complex, as lower courts enforce different standards with barely any
guidance from the EPA and the DOJ.  Some response or guidance is sorely
needed to clear up the confusing and complicated jurisdiction issues
surrounding the CWA so that it can be actively and effectively enforced by the
Corps of Engineers without needless costly litigation.
A.  Supreme Court Interpretation of the Jurisdictional Limits of the CWA
The CWA’s last category of waters, wetlands “adjacent” to other
navigable waters, is where jurisdiction has been difficult to clearly define.  In
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the difficulty of defining the boundary of jurisdiction under the CWA, but
concluded that “the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water
ends and land begins.”   The Riverside Bayview Court upheld the Corps’11
exercise of jurisdiction over the wetlands in question because they “actually
abut[ted] on” navigable waters.   After Riverside Bayview, the Corps12
broadened its interpretation of the CWA, asserting jurisdiction over any
waters which “are or would be used as habitat” by migratory birds.   The13
Supreme Court later struck down this “Migratory Bird Rule” in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),
which involved what Justice Rehnquist referred to as an “abandoned sand and
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gravel pit,” that the Corps claimed fell within their jurisdiction under the
“Migratory Bird Rule.”   The court reasoned that the “significant nexus14
between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” was the critical distinction in
Riverside Bayview, and found that this nexus was lacking in the wetlands at
issue in SWANCC.   After the Court’s decision in SWANCC the Corps15
provided notice of proposed rulemaking in light of the decision, but it never
actually amended its regulations.   In the years after the SWANCC decision,16
various lower courts upheld the Corps’ broad assertions of jurisdiction over
a number of “ephemeral channels and drains” as “tributaries” under the Corps
regulations, including 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches next
to an interstate highway which intermittently contained surface water flow, as
well as the “washes and arroyos of [an] arid development” through which
“water courses . . . during periods of heavy rain.”17
Prior to the grant of certiorari in Rapanos and Carabell, the question of
which wetlands were covered under the CWA was unclear to say the least.
Riverside Bayview illustrated that wetlands directly abutting navigable waters,
qualified as adjacent, and fell within the jurisdiction of the Corps.   However,18
some connection with navigable waters was necessary, as SWANCC showed
that isolated waters with no connection to traditional navigable waters would
not fall under the purview of the CWA.   Many had hoped that the Supreme19
Court’s decision in Rapanos would provide some clarity in this murky area,
but these hopes were dashed when the Court’s opinion came down.
The fractured Court issued five separate opinions, none of which received
the support of a majority of the Justices.   Several different standards were20
articulated by the Justices, but none provides a clear reasoning for lower
courts to now follow.   In the several months since the Rapanos decision,21
several circuit courts have dealt with this issue, but they have followed
different opinions and adopted different rationales.   The Corps has taken22
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steps to bring itself in line with the Court’s decision by proposing amendments
to their rules, but these have not yet been implemented, and so their impact is
as yet unclear.   The EPA Appeals Board has also decided several23
administrative actions, remanding them back to the Administrative Law Judge
so that they can be considered in light of Rapanos, but the Appeals Board
provided little if any guidance as to which opinion should control.   The EPA24
has been working closely with the Corps of Engineers to draft a directive as
to how courts should interpret Rapanos, though nothing has been officially
released.   Congress has responded as well; following the 2006 midterm25
elections, members of both the House and Senate raised the issue of clarifying
federal wetlands regulation.26
So far, the Rapanos decision itself has done little to clarify this area of
law, and has instead made the issues more complex and the outcome of future
cases quite difficult to predict.  The issues may not clear up until the Supreme
Court grants certiorari in a future case, or until the Corps or EPA issues clear
precise directives on how to implement the decision.  A handful of conflicting
decisions already exist at the circuit court level, and this number will only
grow.
II.  THE RAPANOS DECISION
The decision in Rapanos was extremely convoluted, with five separate
opinions being written by the divided Court.   The Court concluded, by a 5-427
vote, that the combined cases should each be vacated and remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.   However no single controlling28
standard was articulated to provide guidance on remand.  Instead, three
separate standards were articulated:  that of Justice Scalia (the plurality, to
which four Justices subscribed), that of Justice Stevens (the dissent, which
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commanded another four votes), and Justice Kennedy’s standard, to which no
other Justice joined.29
Since none of these opinions was able to gain at least five votes, none is
binding on the lower courts.   However, in Marks v. United States, the30
Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”   This standard31
seems to provide some guidance for lower courts; however it raises the
question of which of the opinions is based on the “narrowest grounds.”   In32
order to fully understand the decision and to determine the future landscape
of this area, it is necessary to analyze the two key opinions (that of the
plurality and that of Justice Kennedy) and to a lesser extent, the dissenting
opinion of Justice Stevens and concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts.
A.  Facts of Rapanos and Carabell
Rapanos involved two consolidated cases from the Sixth Circuit.   In the33
first case, Rapanos v. United States, the petitioner, John Rapanos, deposited
fill material without a permit into wetlands on three separate sites.   The first34
parcel, known as “the Salzburg site” consisted of 230 acres of which 28 were
wetlands.  The district court found that water from these wetlands spills into
the Hoppler Drain to the north of the property, which carries water to Hoppler
Creek, which in turn connects with the Kawkawlin River, which is
navigable.   The second site, known as the Hines Road site covers 275 acres,35
and contains 64 acres of wetlands.   The wetlands have a surface water36
connection to the Rose Drain, which carries water to the Tittabawassee River,
a navigable waterway.   The third parcel, the Pine River site, covers roughly37
200 acres, of which 49 are wetlands.   Similarly, the wetlands shared a38
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surface-water connection with the nearby Pine River, which along with the
Kawkawlin River, empties into Lake Huron.39
The second case, Carabell v. Army Corps of Engineers, involved a small
16 acre parcel, of which nearly 16 acres are wetlands.   The petitioners were40
denied a permit by the Corps after they sought to fill the wetlands which are
located roughly one mile from 430-square mile Lake St. Clair.   The wetlands41
were bordered on one side by a man-made berm, which most of the time
blocked surface water flow from the wetlands into a ditch on the other side of
the berm.   The trial court heard testimony that if the property were filled in,42
“you would start seeing some overflow” during a large storm.   On the43
northern end of the property, the ditch connects with the Sutherland-Oemig
Drain, which carries water year-round and empties into Auvase Creek, which
in turn empties into Lake St. Clair.   At the southern end of the property the44
same ditch connects to other ditches which again empty into Auvase Creek.45
B.  The Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, concluded that none of the
wetlands at issue fell within the jurisdiction of the Corps under the CWA
because the wetlands were not “waters of the United States” themselves, nor
were they “adjacent to” any “waters of the United States” under the Corps’
regulations.   The plurality concluded that the Corps’ regulations, as they46
were then written, were overbroad and not “based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”47
In the view of the plurality, the phrase “the waters of the United States”
should be limited to “only those relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water,” commonly referred to as streams,
lakes, rivers, or oceans.   According to the plurality, the phrase, and thus the48
reach of the Corps’ jurisdiction, should not include “channels through which
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water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically
provide drainage for rainfall.”   Thus, to be covered under the CWA, a49
wetland must be adjacent to a “water of the United States,” or in the words of
the plurality, “a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional
interstate navigable waters.”   Under the plurality’s standard, only “wetlands50
with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United
States’ in their own right” can be deemed to be “adjacent to” navigable
waters.51
The wetlands at issue in these two cases fell outside of the jurisdiction of
the Corps under the plurality’s standard because they lacked a “continuous
surface connection” to “waters of the United States,” and thus were not
“adjacent” to CWA covered “waters.”   Under this formulation, the ditches52
and drains connecting the Rapanos and Carabell sites to traditional navigable
in fact waters would also have to be “waters of the United States” themselves
in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers.  Since they
are only intermittent or ephemeral, and only “periodically provide drainage for
rainfall,” these various drains and ditches would not be considered “waters of
the United States” themselves under the plurality’s standard.   In addition,53
even if the ditches and drains were sufficiently permanent to constitute
“waters of the United States” under the plurality’s formulation, the wetlands
at issue would have to share a “continuous surface connection” with the
ditches and drains.   Because this is not the case, these wetlands are not54
“adjacent to” waters which themselves would be covered by the CWA.
The standard articulated by the plurality is the most restrictive of the
Corps and the most limiting of federal jurisdiction under the CWA.  This not
surprising, since the plurality was made up of the four Justices most in favor
of restricting federal power (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito).  The plurality’s standard, if followed by lower
courts, could have the most dramatic impact on federal jurisdiction, by
removing many wetlands from the protection of the CWA even though
discharge of fill or other materials into these wetlands might have a critical
impact on other waters downstream.  This limiting definition seems to
contravene the purposes of the CWA, as it would provide no protection
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against someone dumping pollutants into these wetlands, though those
pollutants could reach local lakes and rivers, or even major bodies of water
such as Lake Huron in the case of Pine River site in Rapanos.55
C.  Justice Kennedy’s “Significant Nexus” Standard
Perhaps the most critical voice in the Rapanos mix is that of Justice
Kennedy, who attempts to reach a middle ground between the plurality and the
dissent.  Justice Kennedy provides the fifth vote to vacate and remand each
case to the district court.   However, he lays out a framework far different56
from that offered by the plurality.   In Justice Kennedy’s view, the proper test57
is that in order to fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA, there must be a
“significant nexus” between the wetland at issue and waters which, “are or
were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.”   Absent this58
link, the Corps cannot assert jurisdiction over a wetland located in close
proximity to a navigable water.   This nexus, according to Justice Kennedy,59
was the key distinction in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC.   The wetland at60
issue in Riverside Bayview directly abutted a creek which was navigable in
fact.   The waters at issue in SWANCC however, consisted of abandoned61
mining pits that over time became a “scattering of permanent and seasonal
ponds” with no connection to waters which were navigable in fact.   The62
“significant nexus” to a navigable in fact water was the critical factor in the
Court’s upholding of the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview;
whereas, the lack of any such “significant nexus” led the Court to conclude in
SWANCC that the Corps had overstepped its jurisdictional bounds.   Justice63
Kennedy concludes that where the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands based on
their adjacency to the non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, “the
Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis.”   Thus,64
here, where jurisdiction is based on adjacency to non-navigable tributaries, the
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Corps must establish the presence of a significant nexus between the wetlands
and the non-navigable tributaries.
In laying out this test, Justice Kennedy discusses several factors serving
to illustrate the presence or absence of the requisite nexus to a navigable
water.   While he does not provide much specific guidance, Justice Kennedy65
states that wetlands will possess the appropriate nexus if they “significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters,” those which are or could be navigable in fact.   On the other hand,66
when wetlands’ effect on the quality of neighboring waters is “speculative or
insubstantial,” they do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Corps under the
statute.67
Given that the focus of this test is the wetlands’ effect on navigable in
fact waters, Justice Kennedy discusses several considerations that, “may be
important in assessing the nexus,” but is less than precise as to how exactly
these are to be weighed.   First, the “nexus” must be examined in light of the68
overall goals and purposes of the CWA, namely to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”69
Kennedy indicates that the quality and regularity of flow in the adjacent
tributaries may be important, but he does not expand on this any further.70
Physical proximity to navigable waters is another important factor in this
analysis.   He also indicates that surface water connections to the tributaries71
of navigable waters are important, especially in addition to evidence regarding
the “significance of the tributaries to which the wetlands are connected.”72
However, he does firmly state that the presence of a mere hydrological
connection is not required to establish a significant nexus, and in many cases
such a connection may be too insubstantial to establish the required nexus.73
Justice Kennedy concludes that the lower courts were correct in choosing to
apply the significant nexus standard; however, they incorrectly applied the
standard.   The district courts did hear evidence on some of these factors, but74
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because not all the factors were fully assessed, Justice Kennedy voted to
remand for appropriate consideration of the significant nexus standard.75
D.  The Dissent
Justice Stevens, in dissent, takes a polar opposite view to that of the
plurality.  While Justice Scalia sees the Corps exercising “the discretion of an
enlightened despot” in deciding which wetlands are covered under the CWA,
the dissent defers completely to the judgment of the Corps.   In fact Justice76
Stevens views the Corps’ inclusion of these wetlands within the CWA as a
“quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a
statutory provision.”   Justice Stevens is quite critical of Justice Kennedy’s77
approach, finding no statutory basis for the “significant nexus” test in the
CWA.   Justice Stevens also suggests that because no opinion was able to78
persuade a majority of the Justices, the jurisdictional requirement of the CWA
can be satisfied if either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s standard
is met.79
E.  Justice Roberts’ Concurrence
Chief Justice Roberts’s separate concurring opinion was perhaps the most
illustrative of the impact of Rapanos.  The Chief Justice criticizes the Corps
and the EPA for not changing their stance on jurisdiction after the decision in
SWANCC.  After that decision, the two agencies proposed amendments to
CWA regulations in light of SWANCC; however the proposed rulemaking
“went nowhere.”   According to the Chief Justice, instead of following the80
direction of the Court, the Corps “chose to adhere to its essentially boundless
view of the scope of its power.”   He indicates that this confusion and the81
entire case perhaps could have been avoided if the Corps and EPA had been
more responsive.   He also expresses his regret that no decision could carry82
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a majority, and predicts that, “[l]ower courts and regulated entities will now
have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”83
III.  IMPACT OF THE RAPANOS DECISION ON RECENT LOWER
COURT DECISIONS
The question now faced by the lower courts, private land developers, and
their attorneys is, what standard should be followed?  A number of lower
courts have already faced this issue, and their analysis may be illustrative of
the future course of litigation on this issue.  The Corps has also proposed
amended regulations, but these have yet to go into effect.  Therefore, the
potential impact of the proposed amended regulations is unclear.  The EPA
has issued several appeals decisions, which at least provide some guidance for
the future.  As yet, Congress has made no move to amend the CWA and it is
unknown when the Supreme Court will again take up the issue as cases are
petitioned for appeal.
A.  Early District Court Analysis
The first court to decide a case under the Rapanos decision was the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in the case of
United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.   This case dealt with discharge of oil84
from a failed pipeline into an unnamed channel joining Ennis Creek
approximately 500 feet from the spill site.   Ennis Creek then extends over85
seventeen miles to where it joins Rough Creek, which itself extends nearly 24
miles where it joins the Brazos River.   The unnamed channel, Ennis Creek,86
and Rough Creek are all defined as “intermittent” streams that typically only
carry water after significant rainfall events.   In analyzing whether the87
unnamed channel and Ennis Creek fell within federal jurisdiction, the court
discussed the Rapanos decision and chose to follow Justice Kennedy’s logic,
although it criticized Justice Kennedy’s opinion for not providing any
guidance.   The district court looked to the prior reasoning of the Fifth Circuit88
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to fill in the gaps of the “significant nexus” test.   The district court89
concluded that a “significant nexus” did not exist between the mainly dry
Ennis Creek bed and unnamed channels to the navigable in fact Brazos River,
based only on the fact that one feeds into the next “during the rare times of
actual flow.”   While Justice Kennedy provided little guidance regarding the90
factors to take into account in determining a “significant nexus,” the Chevron
Pipe Line court relied heavily on whether any oil from the spill was actually
transported from the spill site to a navigable in fact water.91
The court noted that the dry unnamed channel is “strikingly similar” to
the dry arroyo described by Justice Scalia in the plurality opinion as the
extreme limit of the Corps’ pre-Rapanos jurisdiction.   However, it chose to92
follow Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, supplementing it with prior case law
from the Fifth Circuit.   This case provides some indication that lower courts93
may predominantly follow Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test,
possibly adding to or developing their own list of factors for determining the
existence of that nexus.  However, the influence of Chevron Pipe Line Co. on
future wetlands cases may be limited at best, because it did not involve
wetlands and is not an appellate decision.
The District Court for the Middle District of Florida took a drastically
different approach in United States v. Evans, adopting the suggestion of
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion that future courts may use either the
plurality’s test or Justice Kennedy’s test to establish jurisdiction.   Looking94
to Marks v. United States, the court sought to find the position taken by those
Justices concurring on the “narrowest grounds.”   The court concluded that95
neither the plurality’s standard nor Justice Kennedy’s would control, and
instead held that the jurisdictional requirement would be met if either the
plurality’s test or the “general parameters” of Kennedy’s concurrence were
satisfied.   This holding does little to clear up the Rapanos decision, and96
provides little practical guidance as the court will consider two vague
standards, either one of which may be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over
wetlands or other waters.
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B.  Circuit Court Decisions—Development of Differing Approaches
The first circuit court to discuss Rapanos in detail was the Ninth Circuit,
in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, which dealt with
a small pond in a rock quarry in Northern California that contained wetlands
adjacent to a navigable water, the Russian River.   The Ninth Circuit97
explicitly stated that Justice Kennedy’s opinion “provides the controlling rule
of law.”   The court found that the mere adjacency of Basalt Pond and its98
wetlands to the Russian River was not enough to indicate the presence of the
required nexus.   The critical fact, according to the court, was that the99
wetlands are separated from the Russian River by only a man-made levee,
which allows water to seep directly from the wetlands into the river.   The100
court also gave weight to the fact that when the Russian River overflows its
banks, its waters commingle with the waters contained in the wetlands and the
pond.   Furthermore, a significant ecological connection existed between the101
river and the wetlands, as the substantial bird, fish and mammal populations
supported by the wetlands are “an integral part of and indistinguishable from”
the ecosystem of the Russian River.   The court concluded that Basalt Pond102
“significantly affects the physical, biological and chemical integrity” of the
River, and as such it warrants protection under CWA.103
The connection between the Basalt Pond and the navigable Russian River
in Healdsburg is at the opposite extreme from the connection in Chevron Pipe
Line Co.  In Healdsburg, the Basalt Pond and Russian River are close to
indistinguishable, sustaining the same animal life and commingling waters.104
This is the opposite from the connection in Chevron Pipe Line Co., where
more than thirty miles of interconnected dry creek beds linked to a navigable
in fact river.   The decision provides some explanation of what factors105
specifically the court will weigh in determining whether the “significant
nexus” test has been met, as it emphasized as most important the fact that the
wetland in question, “significantly affects the physical, biological and
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chemical integrity” of the adjacent navigable in fact water.   This standard106
requires a very fact specific inquiry in each case, but at least establishes some
framework for the lower court to utilize on remand, and for other courts to
follow as well.
Following the Healdsburg decision, the Northern District of California
adhered to the stance taken by the circuit court in Environmental Protection
Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co.   The district court followed the107
Ninth Circuit, holding that Justice Kennedy’s test controls, and very closely
followed the factors for assessing significant nexus elaborated by the
Healdsburg court.   For example, the defendant, Pacific Lumber Co.108
(PALCO) argued that the plaintiff must offer proof to “demonstrate the flow
of pollutant along” the intermediate tributary to the navigable in fact water.109
However the court rejected this argument as being consistent with Justice
Scalia’s standard, and therefore not part of the Ninth Circuit analysis.   This110
case may illustrate that the Ninth Circuit will follow a very strict interpretation
of Rapanos, following only the standard articulated by Justice Kennedy, with
no reliance whatsoever on the plurality’s standard.
The Seventh Circuit also chose to follow Justice Kennedy’s standard.111
In United States v. Gerke Excavating Inc., the court concluded, under the
rationale of Marks v. United States, that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was the
narrowest, and therefore the controlling legal standard.   The court followed112
Justice Kennedy’s basic approach, but did little to elaborate on Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning and remanded the case back to the district court for
further factfinding proceedings.113
The Sixth Circuit, the circuit from which both Rapanos and Carabell
originated, has not yet decided any cases on this point.  However, it did decide
United States v. Morrison, a very similar case, based on pre-Rapanos case
law.   The Court issued an unpublished opinion in which it analyzed the case114
according to the “significant nexus” standard.   After Rapanos was decided,115
the Sixth Circuit was petitioned to rehear Morrison again, in light of the
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changes in the law.   However the Sixth Circuit refused to do so, and the116
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 5th, 2007.117
The First Circuit, instead of following the approach of the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits (the approach of Justice Kennedy), took the approach of the
district court in United States v. Evans, concluding that the jurisdictional
requirement will be met if either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s
standard is satisfied.   The court in United States v. Johnson reasoned that118
Justice Stevens’ “either-or” approach would be the most practical way to
ensure that future cases would be decided on grounds that would command a
majority of the Supreme Court.   For example, if in a particular case, Justice119
Kennedy’s test is satisfied, then at least five Justices (Justice Kennedy plus the
four dissenters) would support the exercise of jurisdiction.   If the test of the120
plurality is satisfied, then likely eight Justices would support the exercise of
jurisdiction (the four Justices of the plurality, plus the four dissenters).   The121
Johnson court then considered the hypothetical case where there exists only
a slight surface hydrological connection between wetlands and navigable in
fact waters.   Arguably Justice Kennedy would vote against the exercise of122
jurisdiction because of the lack of a significant nexus, whereas the other eight
Justices (plurality plus the dissent) would allow this exercise of jurisdiction
because of the surface water connection.   If Justice Kennedy’s test were the123
controlling approach, the case would come out completely contrary to the
view of a majority of the Rapanos Court.  The Johnson court held that the
“either-or” approach avoids this potential problem, and adheres most closely
to the “narrowest grounds” under Marks v. United States.124
The most recent opinions discussing Rapanos came from district courts
in California and Connecticut.  As discussed above, the District Court for the
Northern District of California followed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Healdsburg.   The District Court for the District of Connecticut took the125
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“either-or” approach, analyzing the case under both standards.   The district126
court discussed recent decisions regarding Rapanos, describing the approach
of the First Circuit in Johnson as the “common sense approach.”   Even127
though it indicates that the “either-or” standard and the significant nexus
standard will often yield the same result, the court followed the Johnson
approach.128
While the Johnson approach may adhere most closely to the intentions of
the Justices in Rapanos, as a practical matter, it provides less certainty and
clarity.  With two vastly different standards, either one of which could control
in any given case, the Corps of Engineers is forced to make multiple
determinations in deciding to grant permits.  Justice Scalia, in the plurality
opinion, points out the already high cost of obtaining a permit from the
Corps.   However, if more courts follow this approach, these costs will129
almost certainly increase as the Corps may have to make multiple
determinations before granting a permit to a developer.  The cost of going
forward with a suit will increase as well.  An attorney may be forced to
attempt to prove two separate and distinct theories of jurisdiction, not
knowing which one the court will find more persuasive, but knowing that
focusing on only one theory would almost certainly risk a malpractice suit if
the court found the other approach more convincing.
IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO RAPANOS
A.  EPA Appeals Board Decisions
The EPA’s main response thus far has come in the form of Environmental
Appeals Board decisions regarding jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA.
Two of the Board’s decisions did relatively little except remand the respective
cases to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to conduct further proceedings
and collect evidence “consistent with . . . the Court’s opinions in Rapanos.”130
The two decisions contain almost identical language, and each note
specifically that, “the Board makes no findings at this time as to what
2007] FEDERAL WETLANDS JURISDICTION 19
131. In re Smith Farm Entrs., LLC, 2006 EPA App. LEXIS 49, at *7, note 6; In re Vico Constr.
Corp., 2006 EPA App. 50, at *6, note 1.
132. In re Smith Farm Entrs., LLC, 2006 EPA App. LEXIS 49, at *6-7; In re Vico Constr. Corp.,
2006 EPA App. 50, at *5 (both quoting United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.
2006)).
133. In re Adams, 2006 EPA ALJ LEXIS 33, at *66-69 (Oct. 18, 2006).
134. Id. at 67-70.
135. Id. at 67, note 61 (citing EPA Supp. Br. at 11-12).
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id.
jurisdictional test or tests should govern on remand.”   However, the Board131
does note in each decision that its approach is consistent with that of the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gerke Excavating Inc., and the Board
quotes Gerke Excavating Inc. explaining that Justice Kennedy’s standard
“must govern the further stages of this litigation.”   This may be at least an132
implicit endorsement of Justice Kennedy’s rationale, but until the ALJ re-
hears each of these cases, lack of clarity exists as to which of the Rapanos
standards the ALJ will follow.
A third case decided by the EPA ALJ gives some insight into the court’s
analysis, however it provides conflicting signals.   The Adams court133
discusses the Rapanos decision, mainly to point out that the “decision has no
effect on this case” because the discharge of dredged material was not made
into a wetland, but directly into a stream.   However, in a footnote, the court134
discusses the parties’ supplemental (post-Rapanos) briefs, specifically that of
the EPA, which concludes that Rapanos permits both the plurality’s test and
Justice Kennedy’s test to determine CWA jurisdiction.   Despite this135
indication that the EPA itself endorses the Johnson approach, the court soon
after indicates that the opinion of Justice Kennedy is “for now, the only
opinion that matters.”   Although it seems contrary to the view proposed by136
the EPA itself, the court seems strongly in favor of applying only Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” approach.   This may prove true, and remains137
to be seen as the Smith Farm and Vico Construction cases are now back before
the ALJ.  As is the case with the various district and circuit court cases, only
time will tell as cases proceed at the lower court level.
B.  Change in Corps of Engineers’ Stance
To date, the Corps of Engineers has not amended its regulations in any
way, but it has proposed changes to its nationwide permits (NWPs) in
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response to the Rapanos decision.   In its “Proposal to Reissue and Modify138
Nationwide Permits,” the Corps must post the proposal so that it may remain
open for public comment for sixty days.   In the proposal, the Corps lays out139
its post-Rapanos approach to jurisdictional determinations regarding
intermittent and ephemeral streams and their adjacent wetlands.  It
acknowledges that the decision raises questions about its jurisdiction over
“some” of these intermittent and ephemeral streams.   The Corps states that140
it “will asses jurisdiction regarding such waters on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with evolving case law and any future guidance that may be issued
by appropriate executive branch agencies.”141
The public comment period for the proposal ended on November 27, 2006
and nothing has been instituted.   Therefore, the future of the proposal is not142
yet known.  However, some industry groups have urged that these new permits
be postponed until the EPA and the Corps publish their anticipated guidance
on the state of the law.   The Water Resources Control Board has criticized143
the proposed nationwide permits, stating that the proposal does not address the
key question of whether the federal government has the power to regulate
wetlands and forces the Corps to make “case-by-case” determinations.144
The new NWPs provide some insight as to the possible thinking of the
Corps regarding the Rapanos decision.   For example, the Corps states that145
the decision raises questions about its jurisdiction over “some” intermittent
and ephemeral streams and their adjacent wetlands and thus indicates that it
does not believe the plurality’s approach to be the controlling standard.   The146
plurality opinion plainly states that the phrase “waters of the United States,”
over which the Corps has jurisdiction, “does not include channels through
which water flows intermittently or ephemerally.”   If the Corps understood147
the plurality to be the controlling standard, then there would be no question
raised as to its jurisdiction over intermittent and ephemeral streams, because
under the plurality’s opinion, the Corps does not have jurisdiction over these
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“waters.”  However the Corps’ comments on the NWPs indicate that they are
“proposing greater protection for ephemeral streams,” which is completely
contrary to the plurality’s position.   Perhaps the Corps’ language indicates148
that it instead understands Justice Kennedy’s standard to be controlling.  This
uncertainty and lack of clarity is what has led many industry groups to speak
out against the new NWPs.149
What is certain is that the Corps must make case-by-case determinations
based upon evolving case law.   This poses problems for the Corps in terms150
of its everyday enforcement, and decisions regarding permits.  While the new
NWPs arguably give the Corps more flexibility, it is likely that decisions will
take longer to make, which in turn will likely increase the cost to developers
in obtaining permits.  There is also the obvious cost of litigation as the Corps
defends future suits.  With no one really winning in Rapanos, groups on both
sides of the issue (developers and builders on one hand, environmental
activists on the other hand) will most certainly attempt to bring future cases
in an effort to obtain some clarity.
C.  EPA and Corps of Engineers Joint Guidance
While the EPA Appeals Board decisions and proposed rulemaking by the
Corps of Engineers have not provided much guidance the two agencies have
been working jointly to provide official guidance as to how future cases
should be handled.   The EPA has been working very closely with the Corps151
of Engineers and the Department of Justice since the Rapanos decision came
down to draft guidance addressing the problems raised by the Rapanos
decision.   Nothing has been released yet, but comments by high ranking152
EPA officials indicate that the position of the EPA will be that a wetland
satisfies jurisdictional requirements if it meets either Justice Kennedy’s test,
or that of the plurality.   This position is consistent with the approach taken153
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).   Officials would not comment on154
when exactly these guidelines would be released, but indicated that they were
“very close” to publishing them.   Some comments have indicated that the155
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DOJ, EPA, and the Corps are currently “struggling’ to develop the guidance,”
and though EPA officials ensure the guidance will be published soon, they
refuse to give any timeframe.156
It is hoped that this guidance will provide some measure of clarity in the
area, given that the EPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the DOJ have all
endorsed one position.  However, the effect this guidance will have on the 9th
and 7th Circuits, which have already strongly endorsed Justice Kennedy’s test,
cannot be foreseen.
The same position expected to be articulated in the EPA guidance was
urged by the DOJ in briefs before the 9th Circuit, but was not adopted.   The157
DOJ has taken a position consistent with that of the expected EPA guidance
in several governmental briefs, arguing that wetlands should be deemed
jurisdictional if they satisfy either Justice Kennedy’s test, or the plurality’s
test.   However, the most recent brief written by the DOJ makes no mention158
of the guidance being prepared by the EPA.   The DOJ has also asked the 7th159
and 9th Circuits, the two circuit courts which have explicitly endorsed Justice
Kennedy’s test, to adopt the “either-or” approach adopted in several Circuits
and endorsed by the EPA and Corps of Engineers.   It is unclear how160
persuasive the official EPA guidance will be, given the 9th Circuit’s strong
endorsement of Justice Kennedy’s standard in Healdsburg.161
V.  CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The legislative branch is typically the slowest to react, but there are some
indications that the incoming 110th Congress will pay close attention to this
issue.  No legislative action was taken after the Supreme Court struck down
the “Migratory Bird Rule” in SWANCC, even though the Corps did little if
anything to limit its jurisdiction.   However, it is now more likely that162
Congress will act, given the controversy that has already arisen in the wake of
Rapanos.
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Just prior to the 2006 midterm elections, Representative James Oberstar
(D-MN), the Chair of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee,
issued a report that was critical of the Rapanos ruling, referring to it as “more
confusion in an already confused world.”   Oberstar, along with many others,163
also sponsored the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act (CWARA), a bill
that would eliminate the phrase “navigable waters” from the entirety of the
CWA and replace it with “waters of the United States.”   Though it was164
introduced long before Rapanos was decided, the proposed legislation is
designed to restore the intent of Congress to give the CWA “the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation.”165
Immediately after the Rapanos decision came down, Senator Russ
Feingold (D-WI) spoke out against the decision and urged the Senate to pass
CWARA.   He also strongly criticized the plurality’s opinion, calling it166
“completely at odds with the text and purpose of the Clean Water Act,” and
stating that it will place “much of the Nation’s waters in jeopardy.”   He also167
acknowledged the likelihood of increased litigation that would result from the
decision.168
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.) also recently indicated that clarifying
federal wetlands jurisdiction is one of her priorities as the incoming Chair of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.   Boxer is one of the169
sponsors of the CWARA in the Senate.   She plans to hold a hearing to170
specifically look at the Rapanos decision, evaluate its implications and to
determine whether further action is needed to ensure that waterways are
protected.171
It is still early in the 110th Congress to know whether any of these
proposals and plans will play out.  It is also difficult to predict what success
the CWARA may have if it comes to a House or Senate vote, and the
corresponding bills remain in committee.   But given the recent Democratic172
takeover it is not unlikely that these bills could see some success.  For the
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moment these bills appear more long term, and right now the battle appears
to be before the courts, the Corps, and the EPA.  However, this situation could
easily change.
VI.  NGO EFFORTS
In several of the recent circuit court cases, amicus briefs have been filed
on behalf of several organizations.  The most outspoken supporter of the
plurality’s standard has been the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF).  The PLF
bills itself as an organization devoted to “limited government, property rights
and individual liberty.”   The PLF has been actively involved in the area173
since Rapanos came down, even establishing a “Rapanos Blog” which
chronicles activity regarding the case and provides links to numerous briefs,
opinions, and commentaries.   The group has filed a number of briefs and174
petitions in subsequent cases as well, all urging that only the plurality’s
standard is controlling, and thereby restricting federal power under the
CWA.   The PLF has filed a petition for rehearing en banc to the First175
Circuit in United States v. Johnson, arguing again that only the plurality’s
standard should control.  The group plans to petition the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., and has been
actively involved in Morrison v. United States, where it has petitioned the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in that case after, as the “Rapanos Blog”
describes, “[t]he Morrisons, nearly at the end of their rope, came to PLF for
help.”   The PLF appears to have taken this case as their crusade, and most176
certainly will be instrumental in any future developments, at the very least
ensuring that similar cases continue to move through the courts and
continually petitioning the Supreme Court to once again address the issue.
VII.  CONCLUSION
In the five months since Rapanos was decided, much has been written
about the possible impact of the case.  Several district and circuit courts have
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already taken up the issue, leading to the development of two main
approaches—that of Justice Kennedy, and the “either-or” approach, the later
approach stating that jurisdiction may be found where either Justice
Kennedy’s test, or the plurality’s test is met.   The practical ramifications of177
these two approaches remains unclear, as the cases have not yet been re-heard
at the district court level.  However, both are certain to increase the
complexity and cost of analyzing federal jurisdiction over wetlands under the
CWA.  In every case an extensive factual inquiry must be undertaken to
satisfy the vague requirements of the “significant nexus test.”  Those
jurisdictions adopting the “either-or” test will require factual inquiry into both
tests if there is uncertainty as to whether or not they may be met.  However,
the “either-or” approach does allow the Corps of Engineers a great deal more
flexibility, as well as greater discretion in enforcing the CWA.  While the
“either-or” test may hold more closely to the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Rapanos, it is likely to be more difficult and costly from a practical
standpoint.
These difficulties will not only be faced at trial.  The Corps of Engineers
will be forced to make much more extensive determinations prior to granting
or denying a fill permit.  This will only increase the already high costs
associated with obtaining such a permit.   Prior to Rapanos, an estimated $17178
billion was spent each year, by both the public and private sectors, in
obtaining wetlands permits.   With the state of the law now in flux after179
Rapanos, these costs will certainly increase, since the standards will likely
prove more difficult to apply, if such standards are even known.  It is likely
that the Supreme Court will be faced with this question again in the not too
distant future, as disagreement is already growing among the circuit courts.180
The EPA and DOJ have not yet clearly articulated which approach they
endorse, though there have been some indications through various sources.
Until these two agencies can formulate a clear standard which they both
endorse, the uniform approach of the Corps and the lower courts will be that
which was articulated by Chief Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion.
Although he joined the plurality, Justice Roberts wrote separately, providing
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some sage advice:  “[l]ower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel
their way on a case-by-case basis.”   This is what the Corps, the EPA, and181
the courts are now faced with:  a slow, case-by-case, wading through the
quagmire left by the Rapanos decision.
